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For a number of months now the Ukrainian gas production sector has been undergoing 
a major overhaul to improve the conditions in which it operates, with a view to significantly 
increasing production. The most important reforms include lowering tax rates and deregula-
tion. These changes are a result of the government’s gas sector development plan for Ukraine, 
approved in 2016. Under this programme, the amount of gas extracted is to increase from the 
current 20 bcm to 27 bcm by as soon as 2020. Combined with greater energy efficiency, this 
would enable Ukraine to become self-sufficient in terms of its gas supply, and even to export 
gas in subsequent years. Because Ukraine has traditionally been dependent upon imports, 
and due to the political importance of gas-related issues, this course of events would be stra-
tegically important and have implications for energy relations in the entire region.
Government forecasts showing an increase in gas extraction in such a short time may not 
be very realistic, but it does seem likely that in the next few years production could reach 
a level rendering Ukraine independent of imports. Ukraine has large gas reserves of hitherto 
untapped potential (the third largest in Europe). Meanwhile, this development can only occur 
if reforms within the mining sector, a reduction in corruption, an influx of foreign investment, 
and political stability are all in place.
How much gas does Ukraine have?
When World War II came to an end, the 
Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic was a ma-
jor producer of gas, and at the beginning of 
the 1950s gas was even supplied from fields 
in Galicia to Moscow. In the mid-1970s, the 
level of extraction rose to a maximum of 
68 bcm per year (approximately 12 bcm of 
this from western Ukraine), which was a quar-
ter of the gas produced in the Soviet Union1. 
In the years that followed, production began 
to fall rapidly, however – to 42 bcm in the mid-
1  P. Högselius, Red Gas. Russia and the Origins of Europe-
an Energy Dependence, New York 2013, pp. 20, 96.
1980s, and 28 bcm in 1990. This was mainly 
due to the potential of the fields in operation 
being used up, a low level of investment, 
a shortage of technology, and a rapid increase 
in extraction in Western Siberia, where the 
fields were larger, easier to access, and cheap-
er to operate. Over the last twenty years, gas 
production in Ukraine has remained constant 
at between 19 and 20 bcm per year.
Despite the downturn in domestic extraction, 
Ukraine has the third largest confirmed natu-
ral gas reserves in Europe (1.1 tcm), exceeded 
only by Russia (35 tcm) and Norway (1.8 tcm), 
and ahead of the Netherlands (700 bcm) and 
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the United Kingdom (200 bcm)2. At the same 
time, when measured according to the inter-
national methodology, Ukraine’s gas deposits 
have increased by more than one third over 
the last decade. 
The currently existing reserves mean that 
Ukraine can improve considerably on its pro-
duction, which was 20.5 bcm in 2017. For 
the sake of comparison, the United King-
dom, which has deposits five times smaller, 
extracts more than twice as much gas per 
year (41.9 bcm), and the Netherlands extracts 
more than 80% more (36.6 bcm). Norway, on 
the other hand, produces six times as much 
(123.2 bcm), with reserves two thirds greater 
than Ukraine’s. The ratio of production to vol-
ume of deposits is approximately 17% of re-
serves per year for the United Kingdom, 6.5% 
for Norway, 5% for the Netherlands, and 2% 
for Ukraine. This illustrates the potential of 
Ukraine’s gas production sector. Also, Norway 
and the United Kingdom extract gas entirely 
from offshore fields, and the Netherlands ex-
tracts half from offshore fields, while a large 
portion of Ukraine’s deposits are located in-
land, rendering extraction less costly3. 
Ukraine’s natural gas reserves are estimat-
ed to be possibly even several times larger4. 
2 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, https://
www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/ener-
gy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2018-
full-report.pdf Under the gas sector development plan 
for Ukraine, the volume of confirmed gas reserves is 
924 bcm, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/npas/249766439 
3 Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries: Ukraine 2012, IEA, 
Paris 2012, pp. 84, https://www.iea.org/publications/
freepublications/publication/Ukraine2012_free.pdf
4 IHS CERA estimates probable gas reserves at 2.8 tcm, 
and the Ukraine government estimates them to be 
2.9–5.6 tcm. К. Маркевич, Тенденції та пріоритетні 
напрями розвитку вітчизняного газовидобутку, 
Razumkov Centre, 28.10.2015, http://old.razumkov.org.
ua/upload/1446025738_file.pdf
This applies in particular to unconventional 
gas (shale gas, coalbed methane, tight gas 
sands). Ukraine attempted shale gas pros-
pecting and exploitation (under agreements 
with Shell and Chevron signed in 2013), but 
this was unsuccessful, and a return to this 
cannot be expected in the next years5. The 
Black Sea and Sea of Azov shelves are poten-
tially rich in energy reserves, but promising 
tests could not be continued due to Russia’s 
annexing of the region (except for Odessa). 
As a result, projects to increase production 
from conventional inland fields will be the 
most promising over the next few years.
The structure of the gas mining sector
Almost 75% of Ukraine’s gas is extracted by 
the state-owned Ukrgazvydobuvannya (UGV), 
which is a subsidiary of Naftogaz. In recent 
years, it has maintained a production level of 
approximately 15 bcm (see diagram 1). 20% 
of production comes from approximately 
50 private gas companies (in reality only a few 
truly count), and the level of extraction has 
been increasing rapidly in recent years. While 
their total production in 2008 was 1.8 bcm, 
by 2017 it was 4.1 bcm. The major private 
firms are: Naftagazvydobuvannya (1.7 bcm), 
which is part of oligarch Rinat Akhmetov’s 
DTEK, and the Burisma Group (1.3 bcm), con-
trolled by Mykola Zlochevsky, former minis-
ter of ecology and natural resources during 
Victor Yanukovych’s presidency6. These two 
companies collectively extract two thirds 
of gas produced by private firms. The other 
important companies include Ukrnaftaburin-
nya (0.4 bcm), controlled by oligarchs Ihor 
Kolomoysky and MP Vitaliy Chomotynnyk, 
Geo Alliance (0.25 bcm), owned by Victor 
Pinchuk and Vitol and also PNK (0.2 bcm), 
5 For more detail see: M. Honchar, First steps into the un-
known. The prospects of unconventional gas extraction in 
Ukraine, “OSW Commentary”, 27.04.2013, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_106.pdf
6 Aleksander Kwaśniewski became a member of the Buris-
ma Group supervisory board in 2014.
Ukraine has the third largest confirmed 
natural gas reserves in Europe, exceeded 
only by Russia and Norway.
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and UK company JKX Oil&Gas, in which 
Kolomoysky is the majority shareholder. This 
illustrates that a large majority of private gas 
companies are controlled by the oligarchs. 
Ukrnafta is also a major gas producer, in which 
50% plus one share is owned by Naftogaz, 
and 42% by the Prywat Group, controlled by 
Ihor Kolomoysky and Henadiy Boholyubov, 
who de facto control the firm operational-
ly. A lack of investment has caused the level 
of extraction by this company to fall quickly 
over recent years, from 3.2 bcm in 2008 to 
1.3 bcm in 2017. Up until 2014, Naftogaz- 
-owned Czornomornaftogaz was also an im-
portant producer, extracting approximately 
1.7 bcm on the Black Sea shelf. Following the 
annexation of Crimea, however, Ukraine lost 
control over the firm and its assets. A consid-
erable increase in production by private com-
panies was able to offset the loss caused by 
the loss of control over Czornomornaftogaz.
As much as 80% of confirmed gas reserves 
are located in the Dnieper-Donets region 
(mainly in the Kharkov and Poltava provinces), 
where 90% of Ukraine’s gas is extracted. 
The remaining gas comes from the western 
part of the country (13%) and the Black Sea 
and Sea of Azov shelves (7%)7. 
Plans for increased gas production
Ukraine’s chronic dependence on gas from 
Russia since 1991, which became a special 
kind of political challenge when the war with 
Russia broke out, led Kyiv to take measures to 
increase the level of domestic extraction. Suc-
cessful diversification of Ukraine’s gas imports 
since November 2015 means that it does not 
need to buy from Gazprom, even though only 
a few years ago imports from Russia were be-
7 Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas: World Energy 
Outlook Special Report on Unconventional Gas, IEA, 
Paris 2012, s. 129–130, https://webstore.iea.org/weo-
2012-special-report-golden-rules-for-a-golden-age-of-
gas; According to the IEA, the amount of unconvention-
al gas mined in Ukraine in 2035 could reach 20 bcm.
tween 35 and 40 bcm per year8. Reverse gas 
supplies from the West, however, are intend-
ed only as a step towards full independence 
(see diagram 2). 
At the end of December 2016 the government 
adopted the gas sector development plan. 
The plan provides for an increase in Ukraine’s 
gas extraction to 27.6 bcm by the year 2020. 
When combined with a decrease in consump-
tion, this is intended to enable gas independ-
ence and also, in the longer term, export of 
Ukrainian gas. The official document setting 
out the plan runs to no more than a few pages 
and only contains general information while 
failing to mention any specific measures to 
attain the envisaged targets. Ukraine’s energy 
strategy for up to 2035, adopted in August 
2017, sets similar priorities. 
According to the government’s plans, Ukr-
gazvydobuvannya would play the biggest 
part in this increase, extracting 20.1 bcm. 
UGV itself has adopted a document of its 
own, the 20/20 Strategy, and this confirms 
the government’s forecasts (see diagram 3). 
When Oleg Prokhorenko took over manage-
ment of UGV in 2015, an array of positive 
changes took place within the firm, one of 
the largest in Ukraine. Many mechanisms 
involving corruption, which had hampered 
the company’s growth for many years, were 
stopped. Among other things, the firm’s 
8 T. Iwański, S. Kardaś, From vassalisation to emancipa-
tion. Ukrainian-Russian gas co-operation has been re-
vised, “OSW Commentary”, 7.03.2018, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_263.pdf
The gas sector development plan envis-
ages an increase in Ukraine’s gas extrac-
tion to 27.6 bcm by the year 2020, which is 
intended to enable independence in terms 
of gas supplies and also, in the longer 
term, export of Ukrainian gas.
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new president broke off all agreements with 
private companies that were extremely det-
rimental to UGV and effectively “drained” 
the company’s revenue9. This resulted in 
a significant improvement in its financial re-
sults, increasing annual profit from less than 
20 million US dollars per year to around USD 
450 million in 2016 and USD 1.1 bn in 2017. 
At the same time, UGV’s investments went 
up from USD 200–250 million in 2015–2016 
to USD 450 million in 2017, and almost USD 
1 billion in 2018. Gas extraction rose from 
14.5 bcm in 2015 to 15.3 bcm in 2017, the 
company’s highest level since 1993. In ad-
dition, the gas mining sector is one of the 
biggest contributors to Ukraine’s budget – in 
2017 taxes from gas production companies 
came to approximately USD 2.7 billion, which 
is approximately 9% of budget revenue10.
UGV plays a central role in the government’s 
gas self-sufficiency plan, as the company is 
expected to increase extraction by as much 
as 31%, to 7.4 bcm, by 2020. Over the 
same period, production by private compa-
nies needs to increase by 55% to 7.4 bcm. 
This would make it possible for Ukraine’s pro-
duction to increase to 27.5 bcm, of which 
5 bcm would have to come from new depos-
its (and 2.8 bcm of this would come from 
UGV), and the rest from old deposits, due to 
use of new technology11.
9 Ціна українського газу: як розвивати, добувати 
і продавати, Hromadske.ua, 26.12.2016, https://hro-
madske.ua/posts/vidobutok-hazu-ukraina
10 Добыча газа на Франковщине выросла вдвое, Espre-
so.tv, 7.07.2018, https://ru.espreso.tv/news/2018/07/07/
dobycha_gaza_na_frankovschyne_vyrosla_vdvoe
11 Gas sector development plan, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/
ua/npas/249766439
Attempts at improving conditions 
in which the sector operates…
To achieve this ambitious government plan 
for a rapid increase in production, a number 
of major changes have been made over the 
last few months to improve the conditions in 
which the sector operates and to attract new 
investments.
On 8 December 2017, the Verkhovna Rada 
of Ukraine approved a new fiscal regime for 
the gas industry after more than two years of 
deliberations. The tax rate for new fields was 
reduced from 29% to 12% (for deposits of 
a depth of up to 5 km) and from 14% do 6% 
(for deposits below 5 km)12. In tandem with 
this, a guarantee was given that the new rates 
would remain in effect until 2023. This will 
make extraction more profitable and make 
Ukraine more attractive for foreign investors. 
Total investments worth an estimated USD 
6 bn are needed to achieve extraction at a lev-
el of 27.6 bcm. However, the fields must be 
located in regions in which the transmission 
infrastructure is already in place, as this will 
reduce the costs of the entire investment.
Moreover, as early as December 2016, parlia-
ment decided that 5% of tax levied on gas 
and crude oil extraction would remain in local 
budgets, to help increase interest on the part 
of regions and local government authorities 
in developing production. According to esti-
mates, in 2018 this would generate addition-
al revenue of approximately USD 60 million13. 
On 1 March 2018, the parliament passed 
a deregulation act. This act will significantly 
speed up and simplify the permit procedure 
for extraction of raw materials. Some per-
mits have been abolished, reducing the time 
12 In 2014 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine raised the tax 
rate for mining gas from 14-29% to 29-55%, which was 
the highest rate in Europe. This was a surprising measure 
considering Ukraine’s situation with regard to energy. 
In January 2016 it was reduced to 14-29%. 
13 Р. Опимах, Как преодолеть последние препятствия на 
пути к газодобывающей революции, Epravda.com.ua, 
6.03.2018, https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/columns/ 
2018/03/6/634743/
A number of major changes have been 
made over the last few months to improve 
the conditions in which the gas sector op-
erates and to attract new investments.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 287 5
needed to draft the necessary documentation 
from three years to 18 months. This means 
that the new fields will be exploitable more 
quickly. 
…and the current problems
In spite of the positive developments outlined 
above, the changes that have already been 
made are not far-reaching enough to be con-
sidered a breakthrough in the way the Ukrain-
ian gas mining industry operates. This would 
require, for instance, a thorough reform 
of the mining concession system. Over the 
last decade, 90% of concessions have been 
awarded without a competitive procedure 
and took place under opaque circumstances 
that facilitated bribery14. Many were awarded 
to oligarchical firms with links to politicians. 
Over the last two years, no mining licences 
have been awarded. This is incomprehensible 
in a situation in which the government has 
made a major increase in domestic extraction 
a strategic priority. The State Service of Geol-
ogy and Natural Resources (Derzhgeonadra), 
which is responsible for issuing mining licenc-
es and providing geological data, also needs 
to be reformed.
The first international auction for 50 new 
mining concessions is scheduled to take place 
at the beginning of 2019. This will present 
an opportunity for international power sec-
tor companies, of which there are practical-
ly none in Ukraine at the moment, to enter 
Ukraine. If this does not happen it will be hard 
14 У нас є всі передумови почати експортувати газ, Ukrin-
form, 12.02.2018, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-e-
conomy/2400057-roman-opimah-vikonavcij-direktor-a-
sociacii-gazodobuvnih-kompanij-ukraini.html
to anticipate an influx of capital and vital tech-
nologies, especially in order to revive the old 
fields and with respect to boreholes placed 
at great depths (65% of Ukraine gas deposits 
are located at a depth of more than 3 km).
It is also surprising how many problems the 
central and regional powers are causing for 
UGV. In mid-August a court froze the firm’s 
bank accounts due to a lawsuit filed by Kar-
patygaz, formerly a beneficiary under pro-
duction separation agreements that were dis-
advantageous to UGV (this despite an award 
from a Swedish arbitration tribunal finding 
in favour of the state-owned company)15. 
Moreover, Derzhgeonadra repeatedly failed 
to renew UGV’s mining licences, causing 
extraction work stoppages. The Poltava and 
Kharkov province councils have not issued 
Ukraine’s largest gas company any new con-
cessions for two years, even though over the 
same period 14 new licences were issued to 
firms that did not have any track record.
Prospects
Ukraine’s gas reserves mean that it can cer-
tainly increase gas extraction considerably 
and within a few years become a country that 
does not depend upon imports. Neverthe-
less, this implies that two requirements will 
have to be met. The first is increased energy 
efficiency and a decrease in consumption of 
approximately 15% from the current 32 bcm 
to 27 bcm. The second is continued improve-
ment of the conditions in which the sector 
operates, so that the level of extraction can 
increase by a third. The changes that have 
been made up to now were adopted far too 
late and are still too limited for the principal 
target set in the government plan to be met, 
namely, gas independence.
15 Рахунки АТ «Укргазвидобування» арештовано, Ukr-
hazwydobuwannia, 20.08.2018; http://ugv.com.ua/uk/
page/rahunki-at-ukrgazvidobuvanna-arestovano
 The Ukraine media have reported that Karpatygaz is 
controlled among others by oligarchs Dmytro Firtash 
and Mykola Martynenko, an influential politician of the 
National Front, who is in the ruling coalition.
Ukraine’s gas reserves mean that it can 
certainly increase gas extraction consider-
ably and within a few years become a coun-
try that does not depend upon imports.
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APPENDIX
The serious delay in implementing the doc-
ument is confirmed by disappointing figures 
for the first half of 2018. UGV’s extraction lev-
el rose by a mere 0.8%, while that of private 
firms fell by 1%, despite forecasts that for the 
whole of this year production would increase 
by 7%16. This is a result of the expectation 
on the part of mining companies that the re-
forms would continue, but also of the cur-
rent problems described above. It is clear at 
the same time that the changes approved in 
recent months have already led to increased 
investment activity. This is confirmed by re-
cord growth in maintenance services and the 
fact that in Q1 2018 the number of boreholes 
constructed by private firms went up by 80% 
on the same period last year17, but it will be 
some time before this has any effect. 
16 В Украине застыла добыча нефти и газа, “Novoe Vre-
mya”, 1.08.2018, https://biz.nv.ua/markets/v-ukraine-za-
styla-dobycha-nefti-i-haza-2485732.html
17 Без открытия геоинформации не будет нефтегазовых 
аукционов, AGPU, 12.06.2018, http://agpu.org.ua/ru/
news/bez-otkrytiya-geoinformacii-ne-budet-neftegazo-
vyh-aukcionov-opimah.htm
The greatest threat to continued development 
of the mining sector lies in Ukrainian politics, 
however. For many years, the gas sector was 
one of the main sources of corruption, and 
the process of rooting out such practices and 
bringing professionalism to the sector is ex-
traordinarily difficult and time-consuming. 
This is particularly evident when examining 
the problems that UGV is facing. This is be-
cause effectively combating bribery in the 
sector and increasing transparency depends 
on successfully exploiting the potential of the 
Ukraine gas fields. If the political climate al-
lows, from the technological point of view it 
is only a question of time before production 
increases. This will have an extremely positive 
effect, not only on the Ukrainian state and 
economy but also on the gas situation in this 
part of Europe.
Diagram 1. Gas mining in Ukraine, 2008–2017
Source: Naftogaz, Ministry of Energy and the Coal Industry
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Diagram 2. Gas consumption in Ukraine and domestic extraction, 2008–2017
Diagram 3. Ukraine gas extraction forecast for up to 2020
Source: Naftogaz
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